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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
l\[()RONI F. BOTT,
)
Plain tiff-Respondent,
vs.
A. ~f. REEDER, aka, ADOLPH M.
REEDER, and wife, ADA M.
REEDER,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
9539

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
Somehow or other it appears that the record on appeal
and the transcript are separated, and thus references
herein will appear as follows: (R) will refer to the lower
court's clerk numbering of the Record, and (Tr.) will
refer to the pages of the court reporter's page numbering. The word ''files'' refer to the entire record on appeal.
It seems that this case involves more of a factual
situation as found by the lower court, than one involving
questions of law.
The files show that the last day in court in this matter
occurred on July llht, 1961 (Tr. 60). Counsel will no
doubt admit, even though the following events do not
appear in the files, that on the next day, July 12th a
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cashier's check for the sum of $2,621.58 was drawn to
the order of the Clerk of the District Court at Brigham
City, in final payment of the purchase price of the
property in question. Mr. Reeder or his counsel accepted
the check and delivered a warranty deed in favor of
plaintiff, which deed was delivered to the clerk of court.
Mr. Reeder obtained from the clerk the cashier's check,
and Mr. Bott received from the clerk the Reeder warranty deed.
It appears from the files that there was misapprehension in the lower court's mind concerning the matter of
interest, for he says: (Tr. 60-61) "I've had the reporter
check the record and the court is about to eat crow. I
want to say in the record that Mr. Reeder in his testimony
stated that he wanted no more than the amount due, and
the reporter couldn't find anything in the record to show
me that Reeder had ever gone to Bott and talked to him
about an extension of time or stated that because of Mr.
~iason that he rouldn 't get the title quieted, and the
record seems to be silent as far at Bott is concerned.
There was never anything said. So I subscribe to the
doctrine of la\Y that you presented, ~[iss Hansen, but
I can't find the facts to justify it. I 'II announce that'::.
the law, but there had to be something happen there, and
neither Reeder nor Bott testified to an~Tthing. Now if
there is anything, you point it out. n
It should be born in mind at the time of this "Triting,
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that

~I

r. Reeder has not yet cleared the title to the

property.
Turning again to the files (Tr. 62) and quoting from
one of the attorneys (Miss Hansen) for appellant: "We
admit he ( 1\f r. Reeder) testified at the time that THEY
1\UREED THERE \VOl'LD BE NO INTEREST. WE'LL E\'"EN AD~flT TO ~\ FINDING FACT." (mine).
In pursuancP to this statement Miss Hansen presented to the court (R. 81) a proposed finding No. 5
a~ follows:
•'G. That at the time the Defendants delivered to
the plaintiff the said Memorandum of Sale it was
agreed by the Defendants that there would be no
interest charged on the sale price until ninety
days after tender of a deed by Defendants.''
The court made its finding No.5 (R. 86) as follows:
"That at the time of the conclusion of the trial of
said matter, and up to and including the 27th day
of June, 1961, at 12:00 o'clock noon, no such tender
of such deed had been made hy the said A. M.
Reeder to the Plaintiff,'.
Then the court made a finding as to interest:
(R. 76) '' ... and that the parties further agreed
that the purchase price should bear no interest,
and that until the expiration of ninety days after
the said A. )f. Reeder had tendered to Plaintiff
a Warranty Deed to such premises, and that after
such a ninety day period, the balance of such
purchase should bear interest in favor of the
said "'"\. :Jf. Reeder at the rate of four ( 4%) per
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cent per annum until payment of the full purchase price.''
Let us now look into the record about this matter of
interest. On cross examination by Mr. Hansen (witness
-Moroni R. Bott, father of plaintiff) stated (Tr. 30-31):
'' Q. You say thia last time that the agreement
then was that there was to be no interest or rent.
Was there another time, another meeting when
the parties - A. We went from the courtroom
(referring to some previous trial) here over to
George Mason's office and that's where I delivered the check to George ~fason, and Dolph (~Ir.
A. M. Reeder) and George agreed both that they
should be no interest or rent at that time until - Q. Do you remember the conversation that took
place~

A. That Dolph didn't want any interest mentioned or something because - - - Q. ''!ell, would you
just answer my question? Do you remember what
conversation took place, ~[r. Bott' A. Yes, I remeinber it. Q. And do you remember "Tho said
what' A. Well, George said there \Yould be no
interest and no rent, and Dolph (1fr. A. ~f.
Reeder) did too.
There was so1ne good reason for this question of "intere~t '' that had a bearing on the closing or administration of an estate that . A..ttorne~~ George ~fason was
handling. Frankly·, the real situation does not appear in
the files, but it ~eems to stein from some settlement of
an estate in the name of "Holl~T". This appears on page
31 of the transcript, "There the follo,ving took place:
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ross X - 1\[oroni Bott senior) Q. \\"'.as there
an~? eonversation hy? ~f r. Reeder 1 Did he sa~v
anything? A. Well, he mentioned at that ti1ne he
didn't \\rant any interest on the whole thing or
~omething. Q. Who did he mention that to1 A.
The four or five of us were there together and
his first 'vife (l\f r. Bott Jr.) was there. Q. You
~a~~ you 1nentioned it to George Mason. A. Yes. Q.
\Yell, \Yasn 't George l\f ason the one that would be
charging him interest on the property if it was
brought up·~ A. We agreed there would be no interest''.
1

( (

Again, let us find upon what ground the court below
1nade its finding as to the matter of interest:
(Tr. 33-34) "Q. (cross examination by Mr. Han~en) N O\V, \Yhat did he say about rent and interest 1
(refering to defendant, n1r. Reeder) A. Well, he
said there would be no rent or interest until he
could deliver the title.''
The court below comments in his oral

~tatement:

( Tr. 41) ''Now as a corollary to that, I find that
the parties agreed that there was to be no intest until ninety days after Mr. Reeder tendered
the deed. Now I can't draw any other conclusion. nf r. Reeder \Ya~ honest enough to take
the stand and sa~? it was about as te~tified, and
I take it that '3 'vhat he meant."

STATEMENT OF POINT
That the lower court did not err in finding and holding
that defendants were not entitled to interest until the
expiration 90 da~~s from date of tender of deed.
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ARGU~1:ENT

The most apt language the writer has found is contained in the New Mexico case of City v. Southwestern
Public Service Co., 161 P. 878 (at p. 884, lower right
column):
''The parties either did or did not agree that the
deferred balance of $130,000 was to be without
interest. The trial court found there was an agreement not to pay interest based upon the intention
of the parties at the time the contract was signed.
The finding cannot be said to be without support
in the evidence. The stipulation in the electric
franchise ordinance that the installment payments
were to be 'without interest' unquestionably evidences this agreement and intent.''
Opposing counsel cite only one Utah case in support of
their position - Farns\vorth vs. Jensen (p. 12 of the
brief) -and this case is not in point because of the
recitation of facts by the Court : ( p. 572, lo\\Ter right
colu1nn).
''The con tract and note both provided that the
yearly pa~T1nents \vere to include interest on the
deferred balance at the rate of six per cent per
annum.''
It should be ren1e1nbered that the \vritten agreement,
Ex. P. 1 (R. 7f)) is dated . August 31, 1943, and that in
the sa1ne ~Tear plaintiff applied to ~r r. Christensen of
Beneficial Life Insurance (Tr. 35-36) to secure a loan
on the property in payn1ent of the purchase price, the
application for "Thirh loan \vas not approved because
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~lr.

HPP<lPr 's title to the property· to be conveyed, was
not Ina rketable.
Appellants and their attorneys agree \vith the position
of respondent, with the findings and conclusions, and
the decree of the lower court, as set out on pages 2 and 3
of their brief:
"It \vas further agreed by the parties at the tilne
Mr. Reeder delivered the memorandum to the
Plaintiff that interest was not to be charged, according to Plaintiff's witness, until 90 days after
tender of the deed.·' And.
"Defendents (p. 3) have no argument with either
finding ( 1) that Reed-er was to give, in effect a
\\'"arranty deed when he obtained a good title from
Holleys, and (2) that the parties agreed there
was to be no interest until ninety days after Mr.
Reeder tendered the deed.''
~Ir.

Reeder apparently agreed with the version of
plaintiffs. (Tr. 14) "Q. When \Vas he to pay you the
$4,000~ A. Well, when we got the deed with title. Q. And
he hasn't got it ~'"et ·~ A. No. Q. So that the $4,000 isn't due
until you deliver him title~ .r\. That's right.''
Further (Tr. 39) "Q. 'Veil, can you tell us what was
said hy you and what was said hy the other parties there
at the time 1 A.
ell, it's been stated, and that is about
right. :\. I have no fault with the statements.''

'r

As late as two ~'"ears prior to the trial Mr. Reeder had
prepared a final written agreement concerning the
same land, \\'"hich \va~ not signed hy the parties, but
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which (Ex. 2) (Tr. 25) made no provision for interest.
(Note: through some oversight the exhibits were not
included in the record, and thus I am calling on my recollection and the Transcript -

I will secure an order,

if possible, to have the exhibits forwarded for inclusion
in the record under 75 · (h) of the Rules.
Under any conceivable theory of this case, all defendants had to do to commence the running of interest, was
to tender a deed to ~Ir. Bott, \Yhich he did not accomplish
until forced to do so by an action for specific performance.
Opposing counsel refer to the equities of the case, apparently without con~idering the facts of the agreement.
This Court said in Salina Canyon Coal Co. v.- Klemm,
76 lTtah 372, 290 P. 161:
·~For

the court to hold that Lehman or hia colnpany is entitled to interest for more than eight
~~ears \vould be conYerting a perverted trust into
a profitable investment for an unfaithful trustee
at the expense of the beneficiar~~."
The logic of that case, \Yhen applied to our case, ( \Yithout regard to the agreen1ent of the parties as to nonpa~~nlent of interest) is that l\~I r. Reeder should not be
put in a position where can con1pel Bott to pay him interest hy· his own failure to tender a deed until forced
to do so by· court order.
It is \Ye1l to point out here that appellant 1nention~
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the t'aet, several titnes, that Reeder could not give a
deed, bPeause he did not have title. This could be misleading, because what the parties were referring to was
the fact that there was somP kind of a cloud on the title,
that Heeder was trying to remove by an action to clear
the title (Tr. 17 thru 20). Reeder is still, at this time,
so far as known, trying to get his attorneys, to clear the
san1e title. Thus, he was in just as good a position to
deliver a deed in 1943, as he was at the conclusion of the
trial.
It i~ significant to here point out that in defendants'
. Atnended Answer and Counterclaim (R. 71 to 73) they
deny that the partie~ entered into a written contract,
admit the exeeution of Ex. P-1, and then (R. 73) affirmatively allege that the parties entered into an oral contract on August 31, 1~l!3. Then in their proposed findings
(R. 80) they set up verbatim, the written contract (Ex.
P-1). Unless the writer has overlooked some evidence
there is not onP 'Yord indieatin.g an obligation to pay
interest, other than a~ found by the court below that the
purchase price was payable within 00 days after delivery
of the deed, and that thereafter, if default be made by
plaintiff (and no default appears), he was to pay interest
at -t%.
The "'riter is omitting the citation of cases where there
is a ~pecific agreement, either oral or written, to pay
interest.
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Counsel for defendants in their brief seem to complain about the matter of some statements made by the
lower court (Appellants brief, p. 3, 4 and 5) being inconsiatant with the final findings and decree. Hurriedly
we point to the case of Williams v. Kinsey, 169 P. 2d 487
(Cal.).
''It is settled that inconsistencies between the
written or oral opinion of a trial judge or his
antecedent expressions and the findings of fact
cannot be considered by an appellate court."
Counsel point on page 6 of their brief:
"It is important to note that ,,~hile the parties
agreed that interest waa not to be charged until
after tender of the deed, there was no contract,
or agreement, either written or oraL 'Yhich specified there would be no interest charged regardless
of any contingencies that might arise.''
The writer does not find one word in the evidence as
to the cause of the 17 year delay in clearing title-the time
is now going on to 19 years There is no explanation. The
only certanit~,. is that this long delay 'Yas through no
fault of l\fr. Bott. Thus, ",.e haYe nothing before this
(~ourt that could bring any of the equities into play as
contended h),. opposing conn~el.
The case of Pett),. Y. t ila rk, 113 f'" tah 205, 192 P. 2d 589
was mainl)r a case involYing- the fact as to 'Yhether an
interest provision in a contract had been "Xed', out
but the contract did provide for a +0 day grace period
in thP pa),.ll10nts under the agreement. ~ince the lower
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court in our ease found as a fact, and admitted by defendant~,

that the agreement was that the purchase price

~hould

dra'v interest only if the same be not paid within
90 da~~~ after deliver~~ of the deed, the Petty case on the
1natter of intere~t i~ in point:
''The interest provision of this contract provides
that the defendant 'shall have forty days grace
on any payment, and the past due payments shall
bear interest at the rate of 1 per cent per month
until paid.' Since the grace period is provided
for as part of the interest provision we conclude
that the parties intended that the interest should
not commence to run on any installment or unpaid part thereof until after the expiration of
this forty day grace period and then only on the
unpaid balance until paid, and that no interest
shall be paid on interest."
Defendants call upon principles of equit~v to aid them
in their claim. It i~ so, that equity may in certain cases
reform a contract to correctly express the agreement
and intention of the parties. But, it is doubted that
equity has ever reformed an agreement or contract contrary to the intention and agreement of the parties.
~either has equity ever made an agreement for the parties. They must make their own agreement. Reference is
again made to the cross examination hy" ~fr. Hansen
(Tr. 33):
"What did he (Reeder) say about rent and interest f (mine) A. ''Tell, he said there would be no
rent or interest until he could deliver the title''.
In conclusion~ the \vriter stresses the fact that cases
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dealing with the matter of interest, the payment of which
is provided for in the agreement itself, are intentionally
omitted herefrom, as not in point and would unduly
lengthen this brief.
Respectfully submitted.
Geo. D. Preston
Geo. W. Preston
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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